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ABSTRACT
In the context of XACML-based access control systems, an intensive
testing activity is among the most adopted means to assure that
sensible information or resources are correctly accessed. Unfortu-
nately, it requires a huge effort for manual inspection of results:
thus automated verdict derivation is a key aspect for improving
the cost-effectiveness of testing. To this purpose, we introduce
XACMET, a novel approach for automated model-based oracle def-
inition. XACMET defines a typed graph, called the XAC-Graph,
that models the XACML policy evaluation. The expected verdict of
a specific request execution can thus be automatically derived by
executing the corresponding path in such graph. Our validation of
the XACMET prototype implementation confirms the effectiveness
of the proposed approach.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Security is a primary concern in modern pervasive and intercon-
nected distributed systems. An important security aspect is consti-
tuted by access control policies, which specify which subjects can
access which resources under which conditions. They are usually
written using the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) [15], an XML-based standard language proposed by OA-
SIS, and rely on a specific architecture: incoming access requests are
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transmitted to the Policy Decision Point (PDP) that grants or denies
the access based on the defined XACML policies. The criticality
of the PDP component, as explained in [8], imposes an accurate
testing activity that mainly consists of probing the PDP with a set of
XACML requests and checking its responses against the expected
decisions.
In literature, there are different proposals for automating PDP
testing, including: mutation [13], coverage [14], random, combi-
natorial [3, 12] and model-based [20] techniques. However, they
share an important drawback: the lack of oracle, i.e., for the gen-
erated requests the expected PDP decision is not provided. This is
an important limitation, especially when test suites are large and
manual inspection of results is unfeasible. Recently, Li et al. [11]
proposed to implement a PDP automated oracle through voting, i.e.
to locally or remotely access more than one PDP engine and collect
their responses for the same request. The most frequent decision
value is considered the correct one. Although effective, this solution
has a high computation and implementation cost and could not be
applied in low energy consuming environments. Other proposals,
for instance [6], strictly bind the oracle definition to the proposed
test generation approach and do not provide generic solutions able
to evaluate any kind of requests.
In this paper, we introduce XACMET (XACML Modeling & Test-
ing), a novel model-based approach to support the automation
of XACML-based testing. Intuitively, XACMET builds from the
XACML specification a typed graph, called the XAC-Graph, repre-
senting the XACML policy evaluation. Such graph can be exploited
for several purposes, for example it allows for measuring the cov-
erage of test requests in terms of the paths executed on the XAC-
Graph. It can also help in deriving an adequate set of test requests
such that all paths are executed at least once. However, for lack
of space, we focus here on what is, to the best of our knowledge,
the most novel feature supported by XACMET, i.e., the first com-
pletely automated model-based oracle for XACML-based PDP testing.
XACMET represents an alternative approach for oracle derivation
with respect to the well-known voting mechanism presented in
[11]. We refer to [5] for the other features of XACMET.
In summary, the contributions of this paper include: i) the def-
inition of the XAC-Graph for modeling XACML policies; ii) the
automatic derivation of an XACML oracle based on the evaluation
paths of the XAC-Graph; and iii) a first empirical evaluation of the
XACMET oracle against two different oracle specifications.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly
introduces XACML. Section 3 overviews the basic idea for the ora-
cle derivation while the XAC-graph and the oracle derivation are
formally presented in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 reports the valida-
tion of the proposal. Finally, Section 7 puts our work in context of
related work and Section 8 draws conclusions.
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2 XACML
XACML [15]1 is a platform-independent XML-based standard lan-
guage for the specification of access control policies. Briefly, an
XACML policy has a tree structure whose main elements are: Policy-
Set, Policy, Rule, Target and Condition. The PolicySet includes one
or more policies. A Policy contains a Target and one or more rules.
The Target specifies a set of constraints on attributes of a given
request. The Rule specifies a Target and a Condition containing one
or more boolean functions. If a request satisfies the target of the
policy, then the set of rules of the policy is checked, else the policy
is skipped. If the Condition evaluates to true, then the Rule’s Effect
(a value of Permit or Deny) is returned, otherwise a NotApplicable
decision is formulated (Indeterminate is returned in case of errors).
More policies in a policy set and more rules in a policy may be
applicable to a given request. The PolicyCombiningAlgorithm and
the RuleCombiningAlgorithm define how to combine the results
from multiple policies and rules respectively in order to derive a
single access result.
For example, the first-applicable rule combining algorithm re-
turns the effect of the first applicable rule or NotApplicable if no rule
is applicable to the request. The deny-overrides algorithm specifies
thatDeny takes the precedence regardless of the result of evaluating
any of the other rules in the combination, then it returns Deny if
there is a rule that is evaluated to Deny, otherwise it returns Permit
if there is at least a rule that is evaluated to Permit and all other
rules are evaluated to NotApplicable. Similarly, the permit-overrides
algorithm returns Permit if there is a rule that is evaluated to Permit.
1 <Policy PolicyId= " P o l _ E x " RuleCombiningAlgId= " deny - o v e r r i d e s " >
2 <Target/>
3 <Rule RuleId= " r u l e A " Effect= " D e n y " >
4 <Target >
5 <Resources ><Resource ><ResourceMatch MatchId= " s t r i n g - e q u a l " >
6 <AttributeValue DataType= " s t r i n g " >book</AttributeValue >
7 <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId= " r e s o u r c e - id "
DataType= " s t r i n g "/>
8 </ResourceMatch ></Resource >
9 <Resource ><ResourceMatch MatchId= " s t r i n g - e q u a l " >
10 <AttributeValue DataType= " s t r i n g " >document </AttributeValue >
11 <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId= " r e s o u r c e - id "
DataType= " s t r i n g "/>
12 </ResourceMatch ></Resource >
13 <Resource ><ResourceMatch MatchId= " s t r i n g - e q u a l " >
14 <AttributeValue DataType= " s t r i n g " >documententry </
AttributeValue >
15 <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId= " r e s o u r c e - id "
DataType= " s t r i n g "/>
16 </ResourceMatch ></Resource ></Resources >
17 <Actions ><Action ><ActionMatch MatchId= " s t r i n g - e q u a l " >
18 <AttributeValue DataType= " s t r i n g " >write</AttributeValue >
19 <ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId= " a c t i o n - id " DataType= "
s t r i n g "/>
20 </ActionMatch ></Action ></Actions >
21 </Target >
22 <Condition ><Apply FunctionId= " s t r i n g - is - in " >
23 <Apply FunctionId= " s t r i n g - one - and - o n l y " >
24 <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId= " r e s o u r c e - id "
DataType= " s t r i n g "/>
25 </Apply>
26 <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId= " s u b j e c t - i d 1 " DataType
= " s t r i n g "/>
27 </Apply>
28 </Condition >
29 </Rule>
30 <Rule RuleId= " r u l e B " Effect= " P e r m i t " >
1The current implementation of the presented approach is compliant with XACML 2.0
but it can be easily extended to address the functionalities of XACML 3.0.
31 <Target >
32 <Subjects ><Subject ><SubjectMatch MatchId= " s t r i n g - e q u a l " >
33 <AttributeValue DataType= " s t r i n g " >Julius </AttributeValue >
34 <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId= " s u b j e c t - id " DataType
= " s t r i n g "/>
35 </SubjectMatch ></Subject ></Subjects >
36 <Resources ><Resource ><ResourceMatch MatchId= " s t r i n g - e q u a l " >
37 <AttributeValue DataType= " s t r i n g " >journals </AttributeValue >
38 <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId= " r e s o u r c e - id "
DataType= " s t r i n g "/>
39 </ResourceMatch ></Resource ></Resources >
40 <Actions ><Action ><ActionMatch MatchId= " s t r i n g - e q u a l " >
41 <AttributeValue DataType= " s t r i n g " >read</AttributeValue >
42 <ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId= " a c t i o n - id " DataType= "
s t r i n g "/>
43 </ActionMatch ></Action ></Actions >
44 </Target >
45 </Rule>
46 </Policy >
Listing 1: An XACML policy
We show in Listing 1 an example of a simplified XACML policy
ruling library access. Its target (line 2) says that this policy applies
to any subject, resource and action. This policy has a first rule,
ruleA (lines 3-29), with a target (lines 4-21) specifying that this rule
applies only to the access requests of a “write” action of “book”,
“document” and “documententry” resources. The rule condition will
be evaluated true when the request resource value is contained into
the set of request subject values. The effect of the second rule ruleB
(lines 30-45) is Permit when the subject is “Julius”, the action is
“read”, and the resource is “journals”. The rule combining algorithm
of the policy (line 1) is deny -overrides.
3 TEST ORACLE
By referring to the example policy of Listing 1, in this section we
explain the underling idea of the approach used for the oracle
definition. We refer to Section 4 for formal details.
Given a generic request, the result of the evaluation of an XACML
policy with that request strictly depends on: the request values, the
policy constraints as well as the combining algorithm that priori-
tizes the evaluation of the policy rules. Specifically, we define an
evaluation path as a sequence of policy elements that are exercised
by the request during the evaluation of an XACML policy and the
verdict associated to that request. Thus, the general idea of the
XACMET approach is to derive all possible evaluation paths from
the policy specification and order them according to the rule com-
bining algorithm. For instance, let us consider the policy of Listing
1, having as elements, the rules ruleA and ruleB and deny-overrides
as the combining algorithm (line 1), the possible evaluation paths
are: (1) ruleA evaluated to true and ruleB evaluated to false: the
associated verdict is Deny, i.e., the effect of the first rule; (2) ruleA
evaluated to false and ruleB evaluated to true: the associated verdict
is Permit, i.e., the effect of the second rule; (3) ruleA and ruleB both
evaluated to false: the associated verdict is NotApplicable; (4) ruleA
and ruleB both evaluated to true: the associated verdict is Deny, be-
cause it takes the precedence regardless of the result of the second
rule. Note that, for aim of simplicity, we do not explicitly consider
the Indeterminate value that is returned in case of errors of the
policy evaluation, and we assume that in this case the associated
verdict is NotApplicable. This set of paths is ordered according to
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the semantics of the rule combining algorithm, and then accord-
ing to the verdict associated to each path. For instance, in case of
deny-overrides combining algorithm, first the paths having Deny
are evaluated, then those having Permit and finally those having
NotApplicable. For paths having the same verdict, the evaluation
order of the paths is based on their length, namely the shortest path
takes the precedence. For the policy of Listing 1, the order of the
evaluated paths is (1), (4), (2) and (3).
The ordered set of paths is then used for the requests evaluation
and the verdicts association. For each request, the first path for
which all the path constraints are satisfied by the request values
is identified, the final verdict associated to the request is derived,
and the path is considered covered by the request. For instance,
considering the ordered set of paths of policy of Listing 1, a request
asking to write a documententry does not match paths (2), (3) and
(4), but covers (satisfies) path (1) since it satisfies only ruleA, so the
associated verdict is Deny.
In addition, XACMET also provides the possibility of automati-
cally generating a set of test cases that guarantee the full coverage
of the evaluation paths. Indeed, each of the evaluation path repre-
sents the set of constraints that should be satisfied by some specific
request values so to reach the final verdict. Thus, the set of values
satisfying (not satisfying) the identified set of path constraints can
be identified using a constraint satisfaction approach [19]. As a
side effect, when the various constraints are combined, possible
inconsistencies between the selected values can be detected, which
hints at the potential presence of unfeasible paths in the policy
specification. Moreover, XACMET application gives the possibility
of knowing which and how many evaluation paths are covered
by a test set. This information can be useful to improve the policy
itself and avoid possible security flaws. For space limitation, the test
cases generation functionality of XACMET is not further described
in this paper. We refer to [5] for more details.
4 XAC-GRAPH
In this section, we provide some formal definitions related to the
XAC-graph model.
With reference to the XACML policy, as an XML document it
can be represented as a tree, called the XAC-Tree. In particular, the
following concepts can be used:
• Contained: Element i is contained within element j if i is
between the start-tag and the end-tag of j.
• Parent: Element i is the parent of element j when j is con-
tained within i and i is exactly one level above j.
• Sibling: The siblings in an XML document are the elements
that are on a same level of the tree and have the same parent.
In particular, given parent i of elements j and k, j is left
(right) sibling of k if j is contained just before (after) k within
element i.
The XAC-Tree derivation exploits the parent relationship of the
XACML policy and uses the following sets of types and values:
• TV = {Policy, Target Rule, Subjects, Subject, Resources, Re-
source, Actions, Action, Environments, Environment};
• TVa = {RuleAlgorithm, Effect, NotApplicable};
• TVv ={ReturnPermit, ReturnDeny, ReturnNotApplicable};
• RCA= {FirstApplicable, DenyOverrides, PermitOverrides};
• RE = {Permit, Deny}.
Formally, the parent relationship, called XAC-TreeParent, is de-
fined as:
Definition 1 (XAC-TreeParent). Given a tree T=(V, E, Root) in
which every vertex v in V has an associated type tv ∈ TV : Element i ∈
V is XAC-TreeParent of j ∈ V if i is parent of j in the XACML policy
document.
From this, the definition of the XAC-Tree as in the following:
Definition 2 (XAC-Tree). Given an XACML policy, the XAC-
Tree is a labeled and typed tree (V, E, Root) where
• V is a set of vertices such that every v ∈ V has type tv ∈ TV ;
• Each vertex v in V has parameter i with i = 1,.., n;
• E is a set of edges (i,j) such that i,j ⊆ V and i is XAC-TreeParent
of j;
• Root is a vertex v in V with tRoot = Policy;
• Root has an attribute called RuleCombAlg ∈ RCA;
• Each vertex v ∈ V with tv = Rule has an attribute called Effec-
tRule ∈ RE.
Figure 1 shows the XAC-Tree associated to the policy of Listing
1. In particular, ruleA becomes the node Rule_3 into the XAC-
Tree. In this case, 3 is the suffix of the node and the EffectRule
attribute of the node Rule_3 is set to Deny as specified in the Effect
of ruleA. Moreover, there is a XAC-TreeParent relation between
Policy_1 and Rule_3 nodes because ruleA is contained within
policyExample in Listing 1.
The representation of the XACML policy is then used to derive
a model of the XACML evaluation. For this, a parent relationships,
called XAC-GraphParent, is defined as in the following:
Definition 3 (XAC-GraphParent). Given a graphG= (Vд ,Eд ,Entry)
and XT = (V,E,Root) a XAC-Tree, where Entry = Root and Vд =
V
⋃
V⋆a
⋃
V⋆v with (i) Va is a set of vertices such that every v ∈ Va
has type tv ∈ TVa ; (ii) Vv is a set of vertices such that every v ∈ Vv
has type tv ∈ TVv .
Element i ∈ Vд is in a XAC-GraphParent relation with j ∈ Vд if:
(1) i is left sibling of j in XT, tj , Rule and i has not children in
XT;
(2) i is leaf in XT and ∃ k ∈ Vд such that k is XAC-TreeParent of i
and k is left sibling of j in XT and tj , Rule;
(3) j has no left sibling in XT and i is XAC-TreeParent of j in XT;
(4) tj ∈ {Effect, NotApplicable}, i is leaf in XT, ti , Target, ∃ k ∈
V such that tk=Rule and i is the rightmost leaf of the subtree
rooted in k in XT;
(5) ti ∈ {Effect, NotApplicable} and tj = RuleAlgorithm;
(6) ti= RuleAlgorithm, tj = ReturnPermit if ∃ k∈ V, tk=Rule such
that the value of the attribute EffectRule of k is Permit;
(7) ti= RuleAlgorithm, tj = ReturnDeny if ∃ k∈ V, tk=Rule such
that the value of the attribute EffectRule of k is Deny;
(8) ti= RuleAlgorithm and tj = Rule, and if k ∈ V is the left sibling
of j in XT than tk, Target.
Finally, a labelled and typed graph, called the XAC-Graph, is
defined as in the following:
Definition 4 (XAC-Graph). Let XT = (V,E,Root) be a XAC-Tree,
a policy graph (XAC-Graph) is a graph (Vд ,Eд ,Entry) where
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Figure 1: XAC-Tree. Label T_P means node of type T and parameter P. The attributes are within square brackets.
• Entry = Root;
• Vд = V ⋃V⋆a ⋃V⋆v
• Va is a set of vertices such that every v ∈ Va has type tv ∈ TVa ;
• Vv is a set of vertices such that every v ∈ Vv has type tv ∈ TVv ;
• Each vertex v in Va with tv = Effect has an attribute called
EffectValue ∈ RE;
• Each vertex v in Va has parameter i with i = 1,.., n;
• The vertex v in Va with tv = RuleAlgorithm is unique and has
an attribute called Algorithm of value equal to the value of
the attribute RuleCombAlg of the Root in XT;
• E is a set of edges (i,j) such that i,j⊑Vд and i is XAC-GraphParent
of j;
• Each vertex j, j, k ∈ Vд with tj = Effect, i XAC-GraphParent
for the point 4 of the definition 3 and tk=Rule the value of
the attribute EffectValue of j is equal to value of the attribute
EffectRule of k.
Figure 2 shows the XAC-Graph of the XAC-Tree of Figure 1. In
particular, considering the conditions of Definition 3, in XAC-Graph
there exists a XAC-GraphParent relation between:
• Target_2 and Rule_3 due to Condition 1;
• Resource_7 and Actions_9 due to Condition 2;
• Policy_1 and Target_2 due to Condition 3;
• Condition_11 and NotApplicable_3 due to Condition 4;
• Condition_11 and Effect_3 due to Condition 4;
• Effect_3 and RuleAlgorithm due to Condition 5. Note
that Policy1 and RuleAlgorithm have the same algorithm
value;
• RuleAlgorithm and ReturnPermit due to Condition 6;
• RuleAlgorithm and ReturnDeny due to Condition 7;
• RuleAlgorithm and Rule_12 due to Condition 8.
The XAC-graph could basically be derived applying a depth-
first search approach to the XAC-tree. For the sake of simplicity,
we show the XACMET approach applied to a policy rooted in the
Policy element. Definitions 1, 2, 3, 4, can be easily extended to also
consider the PolicySet and the XACMET approach can be used also
for deriving the XAC-Graph considering a policy rooted in the
PolicySet node.
5 ORACLE DERIVATION
In this section, we detail the approach used for the oracle derivation
that is based on the XAC-Graph paths identification. Specifically, the
process adopted is divided into two main steps: coloring, unfolding.
The coloring process exploits the concepts of Forward Node de-
fined as: given the XAC-Graph G = (Vд , Eд , Entry), for each node i
∈ Vд it is possible to identity the Forward Node FN (i) ∈ Vд as the
set of nodes j such that i is a XAC-GraphParent of j. Thus, given
a XAC-Graph for each node b and c ∈ Vд , with tb ∈ {Subject, Re-
source, Action, Environment}, the cardinality of FN (b) = 2, and
tc ∈ {Subject, Resource, Action, Environment, NotApplicable}, the
coloring process marks each edge (b,c)∈ FN (b): with red dashed
line if tb = tc or tc = NotApplicable; with blue dotted line otherwise.
In practice the red dashed edges represent a successful evaluation
of the node b.
During the unfolding process the paths are obtained by visiting
the XAC-Graph from the Entry node to each node inVv . The cycles
are due to the presence of the node typed Rule_Algorithm. In
XACMET, the order of the paths strictly depends on the order
in which the rules are evaluated, which in turn is guided by the
FirstApplicable, DenyOverrides, PermitOverrides algorithms.
Thus, let P a path of k nodes on the XAC-Graph and h the last
included one, with th =Rule_Algorithm. If the value of Algorithm
attribute of h is equal to:
FirstApplicable and the node k-1 has type:
• Effect, and EffectValue = Deny (Permit), then the next node
has type ReturnDeny (ReturnPermit);
• NotApplicable, then the next node v has type Rule iff v is
not already included in P (ReturnNotApplicable otherwise).
DenyOverrides and the node k-1 has type
• Effect and EffectValue = Deny, then the next node has type
ReturnDeny;
• Effect and EffectValue = Permit, then the next node v has
type Rule iff v is not already included in P (ReturnPermit
otherwise);
• NotApplicable, then the next node v has type Rule iff v is
not already included in P;
• NotApplicable and each node v with Rule ∈ P the next node
has type ReturnPermit, if ∃ a node p ∈ P with tp=Effect
(ReturnNotApplicable otherwise).
Permit_Overrided and the node k-1 has type
• Effect and EffectValue = Permit, then the next node has type
ReturnPermit;
• Effect and EffectValue = Deny, then the next node v has
type Rule iff v is not already included in P (ReturnDeny
otherwise);
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Figure 2: XAC-Graph. Label T_P means node of type T and
parameter P. The attributes are within square brackets.
• NotApplicable, then the next node v has type Rule iff v is
not already included in P;
• NotApplicable and each node v with Rule ∈ P the next node
has type ReturnDeny, if ∃ a node p ∈ P with tp=Effect (Re-
turnNotApplicable otherwise).
In Figure 3, we show a path of XAC-Graph.
Figure 3: A path of XAC-Graph. The boxes connected to the
nodes contain the functions and values.
6 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We conducted an empirical evaluation of the XACMET oracle. The
evaluation includes two studies: a first study assessed the compli-
ance of the XACMET oracle with the XACML specification given
by the conformance test suite; the focus of the second study was to
assess the compliance of the XACMET oracle with respect to a vot-
ing PDP mechanism, considering both the policies of conformance
test suite and some real policies.
6.1 First Study
In this first study, we considered the tests of the XACML 2.0 Con-
formance Tests V0.4 [16]. Each test consists of three elements: an
XACML policy, an XACML request, and an XACML response repre-
senting the expected access decision associated to that request. We
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focused on the subset of tests implementing the mandatory func-
tionalities and specifically on the following groups of tests: i) IIA:
tests exercising attribute referencing; ii) IIB: tests exercising target
matching; iii) IIC: test exercising function evaluation; and finally
iv) IID: tests exercising combining algorithms. For each group, we
selected a subset of tests specifying only the functionalities imple-
mented in XACMET. In particular, we excluded by IIA group the
tests referring to Indeterminate values, in IIC group we considered
only the most used arithmetic and equality functions (for instance
type-equal) while for IID group we considered the combining al-
gorithms presented in Section 5. In Table 1 (column 1), we show
for each group the percentage of considered tests. Moreover, in
rows from 4 to 7, the structure of the considered XACML policies
belonging to the four groups is described in terms of cardinality
of policies, rules, conditions, subjects, resources, actions and func-
tions (total number of functions and distinct functions) respectively.
Table 1 (column 9) shows the number of XACML requests for the
four groups of tests. To validate the XACMET oracle, we applied
the XACMET approach to the policies of the conformance tests.
Specifically, for each test case we derived starting from the XACML
policy, the associated XAC-Graph and an ordered set of paths as de-
scribed in Section 4 and 5. Then, we evaluated the XACML request
belonging to the test case, against the obtained set of paths, we
identified the first covered path and derived the verdict associated
to that path. Finally, we compared this verdict with the decision
value specified in the response belonging to the test case. For all
the tests of the conformance, we obtained that the XACMET ver-
dict coincides with the expected access decision. This improves the
confidence in the effectiveness of the XACMET approach for the
XACML functionalities specified in the conformance tests.
6.2 Second Study
The goal of this second study was to evaluate the XACMET oracle
with respect to other competing automated oracles. We referred to
the already mentioned black box approach of multiple implemen-
tations testing presented in [11]. Hence we derived an automated
majority oracle by running the request on three implementations
of an XACML based PDP and then using a majority voting to derive
the expected XACML response associated to that request. Specif-
ically, we used a pool of three XACML PDPs, namely Sun PDP 2,
Herasaf PDP 3 and Balana PDP 4.
In this second study, we used XACMET to derive starting from a
XACML policy a set of XACML requests and the associated verdict
as described in Section 3. The considered policies were: i) those
of the conformance tests described before; ii) the Fedora (Flexible
Extensible Digital Object Repository Architecture) XACML policies
(demo-5, demo-11 and demo-26) 5 and other six policies released in
the context of the TAS3 European project 6. For each policy, Table
1 (column 10) shows the cardinality of the derived XACML requests.
Each policy and the derived set of requests were executed on the
PDPs pool, we observed whether the different PDPs produced the
same responses and took as oracle value the majority output. For
2Sun PDP is available at: http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net.
3Herasaf PDP is available at: https://bitbucket.org/herasaf/herasaf-xacml-core.
4Balana PDP is available at: https://github.com/wso2/balana.
5Fedora Commons Repository Software. http://fedora-commons.org.
6Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared Services. http://www.tas3.eu.
each request we compared the XACMET oracle with the major-
ity output of the PDPs pool. We observed that for all requests the
XACMET oracle coincided with the automated majority oracle. This
enhances the confidence of the effectiveness of the XACMET oracle
considering also the functionalities of real policies. Moreover, in
this second study we also applied the test cases generation function-
alities of XACMET. It is out of scope of this paper to validate them
and we refer to [5] for an experimental evaluation of XACMET test
suites. However, as side effect of this experiment we obtained an
enhancement of the requests of the conformance tests. As showed
in Table 1 (column 10), this enhancement is evident mostly for IIB
policies group (201 additional requests). This is due to the more
complex structure of the policies of this group as evidenced also by
the higher number of elements (mainly actions and functions) of
these policies.
7 RELATEDWORK
The work presented in this paper spans over the following research
directions:
Analysis and modeling of policy specification. Available propos-
als include different verification techniques [21], such as model-
checking [22] or SAT solvers [19]. Well-known analysis and verifi-
cation tools for access control policies are: i) Margrave [7], which
represents policies as Multi-Terminal Binary Decision Diagrams
(MTBDDs) and can answer queries about policy properties; and
ii) ACPT (Access Control Policy Testing) tool [9] that transform
policies into finite state machines and represent static, dynamic and
historic constraints into Computational Tree Logic. The capabilities
and performances of such tools are analytically evaluated in [10].
Differently from the above approaches, XACMET models the
expected behaviour of the evaluation of a given XACML policy as a
labeled graph and guarantees the full path coverage of such graph.
Moreover, our proposed XAC-Graph model is richer since it also
represents the rule combining algorithm, the functions, and the
associated conditions. The authors of [17] provide an optimized ap-
proach for XACML policies modeling based on tree structures aimed
at fast searching and evaluation of applicable rules. Differently from
our proposal, the main focus of this work is on performance opti-
mization more than on oracle derivation.
Test cases and oracle derivation. Considering the automated test
cases generation, solutions have been proposed for testing either
the XACML policy or the PDP implementation [2, 3]. Among them,
the most referred ones such as X-CREATE and the Targen tools
[3, 12] use combinatorial approaches for test cases generation. How-
ever, combinatorial approaches are shallow with respect to policy
semantics.
Model-based testing has already been widely investigated for
policy testing, e.g. [18, 20]. Such approaches provide methodologies
or tools for automatically generating access control test models
from functional models and access control rules. The key original
aspect of our approach is in the XAC-Graph model which we de-
rive, which is richer in expressiveness than other proposed models,
and can provide directly the evaluation paths including a verdict
associated to a request. About the automated oracle, notwithstand-
ing the huge interest devoted to this topic, reducing the human
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Table 1: Experimental values
XACML Policy Functionality # XACML Request
# Policy # Rule # Cond # Sub # Res # Act # Funct (distinct) I Study II Study
Conformance Test Suite XACML Policies
IIA (90%) 18 18 12 18 8 16 112 (12) 18 68
IIB (100%) 53 53 6 51 50 98 410 (7) 53 254
IIC (10%) 22 22 22 18 3 1 102 (19) 22 31
IID (17%) 5 13 7 13 - - 60 (5) 5 19
Real-world XACML Policies
2_73020419964_2 1 6 5 3 3 0 4 - 8
create-document-policy 1 3 2 1 2 1 3 - 5
demo-5 1 3 2 2 3 2 4 - 13
demo-11 1 3 2 2 3 1 5 - 8
demo-26 1 2 1 1 3 1 4 - 16
read-document-policy 1 4 3 2 4 1 3 - 6
read-informationunit-policy 1 2 1 0 2 1 2 - 4
read-patient-policy 1 4 3 2 4 1 3 - 6
Xacml-Nottingham-Policy-1 1 3 0 24 3 3 2 - 18
activity in the evaluation of the testing results is still an issue [1].
The automated oracle derivation is a key aspect in the context of
XACML systems and testers need usually to manually verify the
XACML responses. The few available solutions mainly deal with
model based approaches. Specifically, the authors of [6] provide an
integrated toolchain including test case generation as well as policy
and oracle specification for the PDP testing. Other proposals such
as [4] address the use of monitoring facilities for the assessment
of the run-time execution of XACML policies. Differently from the
above approaches, the main benefits of XACMET deal with the
derivation of an XACML verdict for each XACML request.
8 CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced a novel model-based approach to automatic
generation of XACML oracle for testing policy evaluation engines.
The XACMET approach fully automatically derives a verdict for
each XACML request by considering the set of evaluation paths
derived from the obtained graph. We have illustrated the approach
on an example policy and provided experimental results evidencing
the effectiveness of our proposal with respect to the oracle pro-
vided in the XACML conformance tests and an automated oracle
implemented as a voting mechanism.
In the future, we plan to extend our automated oracle in order to
consider more functionalities of the XACML conformance policies,
such as the different combining algorithms and the PolicySet ele-
ment. The XACMET approach will also be extended to be compliant
with the last XACML 3.0 standard version. Future work will also
include further experimentation of XACMET, and its comparison
with other model-based approaches.
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